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We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource
users’ dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real-
world data. Fishermen’s strategies in a fully dynamic game account
for latent resource dynamics and other players’ actions, revealing the
profit structure of the fishery. We compare the fishermen’s actual and
socially optimal exploitation paths under a time-specific vessel alloca-
tion policy and find a sizable dynamic externality. Individual fishermen
respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in
the season. Congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the
long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies.
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Common-pool resource exploitation—known popularly as the “Tragedy of the Com-
mons” (Hardin 1968)—has attracted attention from numerous scholars. Despite consid-
erable intellectual effort, 1 little is known empirically about the pathways through which
the commons affects individual behavior and leads to inefficiency. Open access to re-
sources, or at least minimal levels of excludability, can generate multiple inefficiencies.
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1Common-pool resources are rival in consumption but exhibit some degree of non-excludability with the limiting
cases being private goods (perfect excludability) and open access goods (perfect non-excludability). In his seminal article,
H. Scott Gordon (1954) observed that open access in a fishery leads to dissipation of economic rents and a resource stock
that is below its economically optimal level. Subsequent work has applied common-pool resource theory to a wide range
of natural resource uses including oil extraction (Libecap and Wiggins 1984), ground water withdrawals (Provencher and
Burt 1993), hunting and large animal extinctions (Smith 1975), deforestation (Mendelsohn 1994), fuelwood collection
(Linde-Rahr 2003), and even depletion of the environmental basis for a whole society (Brander and Taylor 1998). In their
classic reference on exhaustible resource theory, Dasgupta and Heal (Dasgupta and Heal 1979) observe,“A remarkable
feature of the problem of common property resource is the variety of examples that one can rather readily construct in
exemplifying it.” (p. 78).
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First generation theoretical work focused on the stock externality; the actions of one
agent affect the stock of the resource, which in turn affects the well-being of another
agent through decreased resource availability or increased costs (Gordon 1954; Smith
1969).2 Resource exploitation is sometimes too high and sometimes too low due to
the stock externality, so open access can also lead to inefficient timing of exploitation
(Smith 1969). 3 A separate congestion externality is static in nature; resource users
can increase each other’s costs contemporaneously through crowding on harvest grounds
(Smith 1969).
The second generation of common-pool resource theory adopted a game-theoretic
approach, but direct empirical testing has been elusive. Game-theoretic models posit
that resource users directly affect the actions of other resource users, giving rise to the
“tragedy of the commons.” Users are typically modeled as players in an N-person game
(Baland and Platteau 2003; Dawes 1973; Sethi and Somanathan 1996).4 While an N-
person game matches the story of the commons nicely, empirical work has focused on the
aggregate level (Bjørndal and Conrad 1987; Wilen 1976). Little progress has been made
in empirically estimating the strategic interactions of resource users, and we still have
limited information about how micro behavior generates patterns of aggregate common-
pool exploitation. 5 Empirical developments using micro data to study the commons
ultimately have been hampered by the inability to observe repeated decisions of indi-
vidual resource users and the methodological challenges of estimating dynamic games.
6
A return to Gordon’s original application of the fishery provides a unique opportu-
nity to estimate strategic interactions and quantify the inefficiencies of common-pool
exploitation. The specific application in this paper is the North Carolina shrimp fishery
for which we have daily fishing participation choices of a heterogeneous fleet of resource
users over multiple years. We model these daily decisions in a finite-horizon dynamic
game. For each fishing vessel, we specify a choice-specific value function, which con-
sists of the current payoff plus the discounted payoff for future periods, and we recover
structural profit parameters that can be used for ex ante and ex post policy evaluation.
The ability to measure efficiency losses from common-pool resource exploitation hinges
2If resource users are forward-looking rather than myopic as in the Gordon/Smith model, open access still leads to
rent dissipation in the steady state but with a different dynamic adjustment path (Berck and Perloff 1984).
3Models that include growth and aging of biological resources reinforce the potential for timing effects (Clark 1990).
Open access can lead to harvest before animals are reproductively mature or before they have reached a size that maxi-
mizes economic yield.
4A complementary literature applies game theory to common-pool fishery exploitation (Hannesson 1997; Levhari and
Mirman 1980; Sumaila 1997). These studies focus on aggregate level modeling such that players are individual nations
rather than fishing vessels.
5A large literature on capacity utilization in fisheries uses micro data to quantify the excess capacity in fisheries due to
open access but without the dynamic component, e.g. Segerson and Squires (1993). See Kirkley, Paul and Squires (2002)
for a review. Moreover, excess fishing capacity can be exacerbated when the fishery is regulated with season closures but
still subject to open access (Homans and Wilen 1997).
6Many empirical studies examine whether Ostrom’s criteria for successful common property resource management
(Ostrom 1990) hold in particular cases, and small-N qualitative studies dominate this literature (Poteete and Ostrom 2008).
While these studies are important for understanding how different institutions succeed or fail in excluding common-pool
users, they do not provide empirical estimates of strategic interactions, nor do they quantify the potential efficiency gains
from rationalization.
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not only on data availability but also on recent methodological developments in dynamic
discrete choice modeling. For estimating the dynamic game, we use a two-stage estima-
tor. In the first stage, we estimate the evolution of state variables that influence players’
decisions. These factors are reflected in choice probabilities conditional on those state
variables. In the second stage, since we have multiple continuous state variables, we
use a simulation-based conditional choice probability estimator (Hotz et al. 1994; Bajari,
Benkard and Levin 2007) to evaluate a choice-specific value function for each individ-
ual. Then we apply a pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) estimator (Aguirregabiria and
Mira 2002, 2007) to recover the structural parameters. 7
The central contribution of this paper is to provide an empirical estimate of ineffi-
ciency from common-pool resource exploitation based on a dynamic structural model
with strategic interactions. We compare actual exploitation paths to optimal ones under a
daily vessel allocation policy that accounts for individual heterogeneity, and measure the
efficiency costs in terms of lost industry rents. We evaluate two different efficiency costs
in the fishery: costs due to a stock externality and costs due to a congestion externality.
The stock externality can be further decomposed into the traditional stock effects (more
fishing reduces the stock and raises costs) and strategic interactions among players (fish-
ermen go fishing earlier in the season because they anticipate lower stocks later due to
the actions of others). These effects lead fishermen to exert more effort than is socially
optimal. Surprisingly, the congestion externality is positive on average and increases the
present value fishery profits. It reduces instantaneous profits, but dynamically it reduces
effort and mediates the stock externality, producing a net long-run gain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main model,
followed by an illustration of the estimation strategy in section 3. A description of the
shrimp fishery and data are in section 4. Section 5 discusses the estimation results.
Section 6 conducts counterfactual policy experiments. In the final section, we conclude
and discuss future research.
I. Model
The shrimp fishery is an annual industry due to shrimp biology. Shrimp reproduce
annually and have a maximum lifespan of roughly eighteen months. Juvenile shrimp
migrate inshore in the spring, grow in estuaries during the summer and fall, and then
swim back to the open ocean to spawn in the winter and spring. This behavior results
in a major harvest season from early summer to early winter that concentrates in the
estuaries and nearshore in the open ocean.
7Compared to NPL (nested pseudo-likelihood) estimator (Aguirregabiria and Mira 2002, 2007), PML does not iterate
and stops with only two stages. We choose PML because NPL requires discretization of state variables and it evaluates
value function on each discretized state point. Higher precision of the discretization implies higher computational costs.
For our particular problem, we have many state variables, which limits the discretization precision. More importantly, we
examine daily dynamic choices, requiring the state variable discretization to be on a very fine scale. For example, in the
peak fishing time in 2000, hundreds of vessels go fishing that day, but it only decreases the fish stock index (one of the
state variables) by 0.06, and the maximum stock index is 81 for that year. This implies that we require many points if we
discretize the stock index. The precision requirement is so high that it simply prevents us from implementing NPL. Thus,
we use simulation-based PML that allows for continuous state variables.
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Modeling an annual industry simplifies the stock externality problem. In fisheries, the
stock externality can lead to two types of overfishing problems: 1) growth overfishing,
which refers to harvesting a fish stock before it is economically mature (before the fish
have grown large enough), and 2) recruitment overfishing, which refers to overharvest-
ing adult fish that compromises the size of the fish stock in the following year. While
it is important to differentiate these two stock externalities when choosing specific pol-
icy tools, most empirical bioeconomic studies are not able to do so. In our case, because
shrimp are highly fecund and migrate offshore to spawn, the cross-year recruitment over-
fishing problem can be ignored, and we only need to consider growth overfishing within
one year. This feature allows us to isolate the within-year stock growth externality and
quantify the annual efficiency gains in the optimal scenario. Our empirical application re-
sembles a repeated experiment in which each year of data is a replicate for examining the
stock externality. Thus, we model individual daily fishing decisions in a finite-horizon
framework in which one year is a complete decision period, letting t denote the day of
the year t=1, 2, ...T , in which T =365.
Another key feature of the shrimp industry is that, if a fisherman exits the industry,
the cost of re-entering is low. After investing in a fishing vessel, a fisherman can easily
change the species target and enter a different fishery. Due to the low switching barrier,
there is no clear boundary between entering and exiting the shrimp industry. For this
reason, we make a reasonable assumption that there is a fixed and finite number of players
(i.e., vessels) each year, indexed by i=1, ...,N, in which, N is the maximum number of
regular participants observed in all years in our sample.
The timing of the game is as follows: on each day of a year, each fisherman has
an expectation of harvest and receives a random profit shock, and then all fishermen
simultaneously decide whether to fish. After each fisherman makes his decision, he
receives a flow utility from his action. The game is repeated each day throughout the
year. Formally, each player faces the same binary action set ai ∈ {0,1}, with 0 denoting
not fishing and 1 denoting fishing. Let A ≡ {0,1}N , which is a comprehensive list of
possible actions for all players.
A. Payoff
In each period t, a fisherman i receives the time-specific profit, Πit , which consists of
a return to his individual characteristics and a random profit shock. His profit at time t,
given his action, can be written as:
(1) Πit(ai) =
{
αPricet ∗E(hit)−β∗S+ξit1, if ai = 1;
ξit0, if ai = 0;
In this equation, if i does not go fishing, his profit is reserved to be zero plus some
random shock; if i goes fishing, his profit is equal to the revenue minus cost plus a random
profit shock. The profit when going fishing is related to two random shocks, one is a profit
shock ξit1, the other one is a harvest shock. The profit shock, ξit , reflects random personal
fishing costs (for example, illness, fatigue, or mood), idiosyncratic knowledge of that
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day’s market or fishing conditions, or outside employment opportunities. It is different
across choices and observed by fishermen before they make their fishing decisions. In
addition, it is private information and observed only by themselves, and not by other
fishermen and the researcher. This profit shock is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across fishermen and across periods, and drawn from an
extreme value distribution. Another random shock is a harvest shock that appears in
harvest (hit). We assume that this random shock is not observed before fishermen go
fishing. Thus, both revenue and cost are a function of expected harvest (E(hit)), which
has been integrated over the random harvest shock.
The revenue is the product of price (Pricet) and expected harvest, and β∗S is the cost
of fishing, which is a function of state variables including the fish stock, fuel prices,
weather, vessel length, and expected harvest:
(2) β∗S= g(Leni,WSPDt ,WV HTt ,Dieselt ,Weekendt ,E(hit),Xt)
Production costs include fixed, quasi-fixed, and variable costs. Fixed costs consist of
capital investments in vessels, fishing gear, and safety and navigation equipment. The
cost function here does not include fixed costs. When making the fishing or not fishing
decisions, the fixed costs are sunk and irrelevant. Therefore, we cannot recover fixed
costs through fishing behavior observed in our data. Quasi-fixed costs are costs that are
incurred if a vessel chooses to fish on a given day, but are not related to the level of
harvest. These include the depreciation value of vessel and gear, labor costs (assuming
a fixed wage), food for the crew, and storage costs for the catch (ice or refrigeration, de-
pending on the vessel). 8 The number of workers required to operate a vessel increases in
vessel length (Leni), so we expect that the quasi-fixed costs of each trip are roughly pro-
portional to the vessel length. Quasi-fixed costs also include the costs of exposure to bad
weather (wind speed (WSPD) and wave height (WV HT )), fuel (diesel) price (Diesel),
whether it is a weekend (Weekend), and fish stock index (X). The cost from Weekendt
is due to government regulations (will be discussed later), and is also consistent with
other studies of fisheries in which market conditions limit activity on weekends (Smith
and Wilen 2005). Variable costs depend on the size of the harvest. Since fishermen only
observe the harvest shock after they go fishing, we model the variable costs on the level
of expected harvest. We expect that as harvest increases, the variable costs will increase.
Note that the harvest level in the cost is also in the format of expected harvest as in the
revenue.
Fishermen compete to produce shrimp by fishing, and harvest is a function of inputs.
Fisheries economists usually measure fishing inputs by “effort”, i.e. number of trip days,
number of crew, amount of gear deployed, and vessel size etc. In addition, harvest is also
determined by inputs outside the fisherman’s direct control, including whether there is a
season closure, wind speed, wave height, and the fish stock. Combining all these factors,
8 Many fisheries use the share system to pay the crew, but the majority of shrimp fishing in North Carolina uses wage
compensation.
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we use the following restricted Cobb-Douglas production function:
hit = qi ∗ ea1Closuret+a2WSPDt+a3WV HTt ∗Xt ∗ eεhit
= qi ∗ eWt ∗Xt ∗ eεhit
(3)
In the above equation, qi is individual catchability, which includes unobserved vessel
fishing technology as well as captain skill and experience. 9 After log-transforming
Equation 3, fixed effects capture this unobserved individual heterogeneity. We assume
that qi is common knowledge. Fish stock, Xt , is a major factor that determines catch.
Stock is not observed by the researcher, although fishermen may have estimates of it
based on their experiences and collectively on any given day face the same stock (Zhang
and Smith 2011). Thus, in our production function, the stock is assumed to be observed
by every vessel before they make decisions but treated as a latent state variable in our
model. Besides the fish stock, the season closure policy and weather conditions also
affect the catch. The total impact a1Closuret +a2WSPDt +a3WV HTt is denoted by Wt .
The stochastic component, eε
h
it , is the harvest shock we mentioned above in describing
Equation 1. It is assumed to be i.i.d across individuals and time, and mean 1. The
expectation of harvest in Equation 1 is integrated over this random shock. Note that
there are no days at sea as a measure of fishing effort in this production function. This
is because we convert multi-day trips to a series of one-day trips in order to simplify the
model. 10
We further allow for the possibility of agglomeration or congestion effects, which
could affect revenue. Equation 3 accordingly includes an additional term:
(4) hit = qi ∗ eγ∗T vesselt+Wt ∗Xteεhit
Here, the total number of vessels fishing T vesselt =∑(ai = 1) on day t affects the catch
through γ, which captures agglomeration or congestion effects. A positive (negative) γ
indicates agglomeration (congestion). Agglomeration in this context means that having
more vessels increases the productivity of fishing, most likely by reducing the search
costs. With congestion, more vessels reduce average harvests, likely because trawling
disperses shrimp aggregations. 11
With eε
h
it being stochastic with mean 1, we can obtain the payoff function for vessel i
9This model is motivated by the Schaefer production function used commonly in fisheries bioeconomic modeling
(Schaefer 1957). See Clark (1990) for further discussion. The argument fishing effort is omitted because implicitly effort
is one in our model when fishing takes place and zero otherwise. Our model is more general than the Schaefer model in
that it accounts for congestion, weather, regulations, and vessel-level fixed effects.
10The data show that 73.7 percent of trips are one day, and 25.9 percent of trips are between 2 to 6 days. To convert
multi-day trips, we allocate the average daily harvest for the trip to each day.
11 The congestion effect enters multiplicatively such that it scales the catchability up or down, depending on whether
there is congestion or agglomeration. An additive term would wrongly suggest that there could be positive (or negative)
harvest in the absence of any other inputs. Other multiplicative functional forms are possible, but we have chosen one
that is convenient for identification; it allows us to run linear instrumental variables.
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by replacing E(hit) in Equation 1 when ai = 1.
(5) Πit = αPricet ∗qi ∗ eγ∗T vesselt+Wt ∗Xt −β∗S+ξit
In this equation, all the state variables can be either observed or estimated.
B. Transitions Between States
Recall that the state variables include all individual characteristics and environmental
information that affect a fisherman’s utility. The variables Leni and Weekendt are deter-
ministic, while all others are stochastic. Wind speed and wave height are not influenced
by fishermen’s decisions and modeled as exogenous variables with Markov chains. The
shrimp price is also assumed to be a stochastic exogenous variable because it is deter-
mined by the global market (North Carolina shrimp industry is only 0.6 percent of the
world market 12).
Formally, the shrimp price, wind speed, and wave height are modeled as follows:
log(Pricet+1) = ρ0+ρ1log(Pricet)+ εpt(6)
log(WSPDt+1) = ρ2+ρ3log(WSPDt)+ εwt(7)
log(WV HTt+1) = ρ4+ρ5log(WV HTt)+ εvt(8)
(9)
 εptεwt
εvt
∼ i.i.d.Normal
 00
0
 ,
 σ2p 0 00 σ2w σw,v
0 σv,w σ2v

The error term of shrimp price is assumed to be i.i.d. across time from normal distri-
bution with mean 0. Note that the correlations between wave speed and wave height are
not zero because they are not independent of each other, while the correlations between
wind speed or wave height and shrimp price are assumed to be zero. The diesel price,
which is also stochastic but exogenous to the North Carolina shrimp fishery, is modeled
with a flexible b-spline function (Chen 2007):
(10) Dieselt = ρ6 ∗bs(Week)+ εdt ,
The variable “Week” is the week number within a year. The basis functions are b-
splines to allow flexible fitting of the data, denoted as bs(.). The mean of error term,
E(εdt ), is equal to 0.
The stock index is an endogenous latent state variable and is modeled as a discrete
time stochastic difference equation (Reed 1974):
(11) Xt = X0G(t)e−φ∑
t
s=0 h(s)eζt
12This number is calculated using information from State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA), 2006. Price
appears to be exogenous even in the much larger Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery (Asche et al. 2012).
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The term X0 denotes initial stock at time 0 determined by nature (exogenous recruit-
ment at the beginning of each year), G denotes the deterministic portion of biological
growth that is fixed across years, and ∑ts=0 h(s) is the cumulative harvest up to day t
within a year. φ is the fishing mortality coefficient to be estimated. Basically, the initial
period’s stock after harvest, multiplied by growth (G(t)), past fishing mortality within the
same year (e−φ∑
t
s=0 h(s)), and a random shock from nature (eζt ), yields period t’s stock.
Since there is no good prior information to describe the multiple types of shrimp in the
aggregate, we estimate natural growth G(t) directly from our data. 13. As in Reed (1974),
we make the simplifying assumption that the stock population is not age-structured and
can be described by a continuous variable. To capture seasonality of shrimp growth, we
specify G as a polynomial of time (days within each year), eb1ln(t)+b2ln(t)
2+b3ln(t)3+b4ln(t)4 .
This seasonal component proxies for age structure of an annual species like shrimp as
long as growth and aging are linked to calendar days consistently across years. The er-
ror term, ζt , incorporates fluctuations in population growth and is known by fishermen
before their fishing decisions are made. We discuss the stock index in more detail below
in the section on estimation strategy.
C. Choice-specific utility and expected utility
To define the value function, it is useful to distinguish choice-specific utility from ex-
pected utility. Following common notation in the literature, let a = (a1, ...aN) denote the
vector of actions for all players and a−i = (a1, ...ai−1,ai+1, ...,aN) denote the vector of
strategies of all players excluding player i. Define si ∈ Si as a vector of state variables
{Pricet , leni, Xt , Weekendt , WSPDt , WV HTt , Dieselt , qi, t}, which are common knowl-
edge to all the agents. Let θ denote the set of all the parameters in the utility function.
Dropping t subscripts, the choice-specific utility is:
(12) ui(ai,a−i,s,ξi;θ) =
{
αPrice∗qi ∗ eγ∗T vessel+W ∗X−β∗S+ξi1, if ai = 1;
ξi0, if ai = 0;
The choice-specific utility is the payoff corresponding to different choices. Note that
the utility value only depends on player i’s private profit shocks and not on other agents’
profit shocks. In the utility, “T vessel” is not a state variable but affects choices instan-
taneously. Since it depends on other players’ actions, it makes the current period utility
not only dependent on his own action, but also dependent on other fishermen’s actions.
Therefore, we need to integrate out a−i to obtain the expected utility ui(ai,s,ξi;θ). De-
fine σi(ai = k | s) as the probability of player i choosing k conditional on known state
13Traditional ways of modeling growth use the Von-Bertalanffy growth function, which models changes in
shrimp number and weight over time. Our stock index consists of three different types of shrimp (brown
shrimp, white shrimp, and pink shrimp), and biologists only collect parameters in the Von-Bertalanffy growth
function for the three types of shrimp separately from the field experiments. Our index can be viewed
as an empirical approximation to the mixture of these growth functions (See different species profile at
http://www.nbii.gov/portal/community/Communities/Plants, Animals & Other Organisms/Fisheries & Aquatic
Resources/Aquatic Organisms/Species Profiles/)
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information, in which k ∈ {0,1}. Then the expected utility is:
(13) ui(ai,s,ξi;θ) =∑
a−i
ui(ai,a−i,s,ξi;θ)∗σ−i(a−i|s)
Note that since ui(ai,a−i,s,ξi;θ) is a function of eγ∗T vessel , integrating other players’
actions in ui(ai,a−i,s,ξi;θ) with eγ∗T vessel directly does not yield an analytical expression
for ui(ai,s,ξi;θ). In order to obtain an analytical solution, we approximate eγ∗T vessel using
a Taylor expansion.
(14) eγ∗T vessel ≈ 1+ γ∗T vessel+ γ
2
2
∗T vessel2
Then ui(ai = 1,a−i,s,ξi;θ) becomes:
(15)
ui(ai = 1,a−i,s,ξi;θ)=αPrice∗qi∗(1+γ∗T vessel+ γ
2
2
∗T vessel2)∗eW ∗X−β∗S+ξi
in which
T vessel =∑
j
1{a j = 1}
Integrating out all the other fishermen’s actions for T vessel (See Supplemental Mate-
rial for detailed information and Bajari et al. (2010) for a simple example), we obtain:
ui(ai = 1,s,ξi;θ) = αPrice∗qi ∗ eW ∗X
∗ [1+ γ+ γ
2
2
+(γ+
3γ2
2
)∑
j 6=i
σ j(a j = 1|s)+ γ
2
2 ∑j 6=k, j 6=i∑k 6=i
σ j(a j = 1|s)σ j(ak = 1|s)]
−β∗S+ξi
(16)
D. Equilibrium concept
Given the primitives of the model above, we can write down the fisherman’s optimiza-
tion problem resulting in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Every period t the agent
chooses his action to maximize the expected utility
(17) max
{ait}
Et [
T
∑
j=t
λ j−1ui j(ai j,s j,ξi j;θ)]
Here, λ is the daily discount factor and T is the maximum time of a year. In this
maximization expression, all other players’ actions and player i’s own future actions
have already been integrated away. If with details of other players’ action, the objective
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function can be written as:
(18) V (sit ,ξit) = max{ait}
Et [
T
∑
j=t
λ j−1∑
a−i j
ui j(ai j,a−i j,s j,ξi j;θ)∗σ−i j(a−i j|s j)]
Players need to take consideration of current state variables, expectation of other
players’ current actions, their current private profit shocks, and expectation of future
state variables, expectation of other players’ future actions and their own future private
shocks. Following notations in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), we define a set of strat-
egy function for each agent as ϕit(st ,ξit) that depends on common state variables and
his own private shock. Then, the probability that player i chooses to fish at time t is
σit(ait = 1|st) =
∫
I(ϕit(st ,ξit) = 1)dF(ξit). Let V
ϕ
it (ait ,st ,ξit) denote the expected dis-
counted present value when individual i takes action ait , all other players behave accord-
ing to strategies ϕ−i(s,ξ−i) now and in the future, and player i follows strategy ϕi(s,ξi)
in the future periods. Then, the best response function of each player given other players’
strategies is:
(19) bit(st ,ξit ,ϕ−it) = argmax{ait}
[Vϕit (ait ,st ,ξit)]
The resulting optimal fishing decision must maximize the choice-specific value func-
tion. The equilibrium is a set of strategy function ϕ∗it(st ,ξit) that
(20) ϕ∗it(st ,ξit) = bit(st ,ξit ,ϕ
∗
−it)
which indicates that the resulting decision rules are consistent with the beliefs about be-
havior of other players, i.e. the decision rules and beliefs are the same in the equilibrium.
This equilibrium concept imposes significant structure on the equilibrium noncoopera-
tive behavior of all players, and the empirical two-stage estimator we adopt is based on
this condition.
II. Estimation Strategy
Since there are many agents and continuous state variables, we employ a conditional
choice probability (CCP) two-stage estimator (Hotz and Miller 1993). This approach
alleviates the curse of dimensionality that can arise in Nested Fixed Point Algorithm
(NFXP) methods, which are typically used for single agent applications (Karlstrom,
Palme and Svensson 2004; Rust 1987; Timmins 2003). 14 The intuition for the CCP
14 Since NFXP needs to solve the dynamic programming (DP) problem, the computational costs are often prohibitively
high. In our model, several continuous state variables and hundreds of agents prevent solving the DP problem directly.
Just solving the social planner’s dynamic programming problem in our counterfactual experiment requires significant
computational time, and that problem need only be solved once and has no strategic interactions. In NFXP models, the DP
needs to be solved in every iteration of the econometric estimation. For a multiple-agent problem like our model, NFXP
becomes computationally infeasible; the DP problem needs to be solved in every iteration for every agent. As a solution,
Hotz and Miller propose the Conditional Choice Probability estimator, which does not require solving the dynamic
programming problem even once. Subsequently in the literature, a number of computationally feasible estimators are
proposed, e.g. recursive CCP, simulation-based CCP, two-step methods to improve or solve different problems. For
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estimator is that there is a one-to-one mapping between the conditional choice proba-
bility and the choice-specific value function under certain conditions (Hotz and Miller
1993). By inverting this mapping, the discounted part of the value function can be rep-
resented as a function of state transition probabilities and CCP’s, which in turn can be
estimated non-parametrically or approximated parametrically in a separate first stage.
We specifically apply a two-stage estimation procedure developed by Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2002, 2007) based on simulated CCP (Hotz et al. 1994; Bajari, Benkard and
Levin 2007). The first stage is to estimate parameters of the state equations that describe
stock growth, shrimp price, weather variables, and diesel price, and then estimate condi-
tional choice probabilities for fishing participation. In the the second stage, we simulate
the dynamics of state variables and evaluate the expected utilities over different paths,
and recover structural profit parameters by maximizing a Pseudo Log-Likelihood. 15 Us-
ing this method, there is no need to solve the dynamic game in the estimation procedure.
The specification of the period utility function implies another important assumption
of this model: observed and unobserved components of utility are additive, where the
unobserved error is drawn from a known distribution (specifically, a Type I Extreme
Value distribution), and is distributed i.i.d. across agents and time. Separability implies
that the marginal utilities of observed state variables do not depend on unobservables
(Aguirregabiria and Mira 2010). This assumption is imposed to facilitate identification
of the second-stage parameters. If the additive separability assumption is violated, then
additional computational problems will occur in maximum likelihood estimation (Rust
1994). The parametric known form of the error term is needed due to the fact that it is not
possible to recover both parameters in observable components and the joint distribution
of ξi simultaneously (see Bajari et al. (2009)). Therefore, the known distribution is also
a necessary identification assumption imposed on the error term.
A. First-Stage Estimation
The goal of the first stage is to estimate the state variable dynamics and choice proba-
bilities flexibly without imposing the structure of the dynamic discrete choice model.
ESTIMATION OF THE STATE VARIABLE DYNAMICS
We use a Generalized Least Square (GLS) estimator to estimate the evolution of shrimp
price and diesel price and a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model for WSPD
and WVHT. To estimate the stock index, we first linearize Equation 4 with Equation 11
instance, Slade (1998) applies this estimator to price adjustment in grocery stores and Aguirregabiria (1999) applies it
to inventories and markups in retailing firms. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) review the estimators of dynamic discrete
choice models.
15The efficiency of this two-stage estimator can be improved by iterations (Aguirregabiria and Mira 2002, 2007).
Using the structural result of the second stage, the conditional choice probabilities can be updated and then used to re-
estimate the second stage, which completes the second iteration. However, as described above, the state space in our
model is so large that it prevents us from implementing the recursive version described in (Aguirregabiria and Mira 2002,
2007).
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and use an Instrumental Variable (IV) regression model.
(21) ln(hit) = ln(X0) + ln(qi) + ln(G(t))− φ
t
∑
s=0
h(s) + γ ∗ T vesselt +Wt + εhit + ζt
Our estimation strategy for this equation is that we first estimate the regression model
regarding εhit + ζt as one error term, and then regress the whole component on daily
dummies to identify ζt . The first regression estimation has two issues. First, T vesselt
and ζt are not independent of each other due to the fact that the unobserved ζt could
affect fishermen’s decisions; a common positive (negative) stock shock for one vessel is
likely correlated with that of other vessels and would attract more (fewer) vessels to the
fishery on that day. In order to resolve the endogeneity problem, we use Weekend as an
instrumental variable. Given that vessel i is going fishing, Weekend is a valid instrument
because it is correlated with fishing choices of everybody else but not correlated with
a stock shock ζt from nature. Second, because we only observe output when vessels
choose to fish, sample selection bias from unobserved shocks in the production function
is possible. We may ameliorate this problem to a large extent by including the individual
fixed effect qi. 16
In the IV regression, the regressors for X0 are yearly dummy variables, and G(t) are
fixed across years from latent stock information but varies within a year. The term
φ∑ts=0 h(s) proxies for cumulative fishing mortality throughout the season, ln(qi) can
be estimated using individual fixed effect. After obtaining εhit +ζt , we identify ζt by re-
gressing the whole error term on daily dummies across all years assuming that εhit and ζt
are independent with each other. The year*daily dummies are further approximated by a
Markov chain to capture its dynamics. In the second stage of the structural estimation, ζt
will be simulated according to the Markov chain. In theory, ζt reflects the random shock
to fish stock. But since we do not observe stock and use daily fixed effect to identify it, it
is possible that this daily fixed effect captures some individual-invariant but time-variant
effect from harvest. If so, ζt is more general, but it is still endogeneous and does not
affect other estimation and interpretation.
CONDITIONAL CHOICE PROBABILITIES
We estimate the fishing decision conditional on the state vector with a flexible logit
model. In essence, we could use a nonparametric method to mimic the relationship
between the state variables and the probabilities (Hotz and Miller 1993). But due to
our large data set and long convergence rate of nonparametric methods, we use a logit
model. As a way to replace the nonparametric method, we include all state variables
(along with vessel fixed effects), squared terms, and the interactions among different
16 In fact, our model assumes that vessel-specific harvest shocks εhit are observed after fishing decisions are made, and
the private payoff shocks ξit do not enter the harvest function and are independent of the harvest shocks. We also control
for the random component of the fish stock ζt . Under these assumptions, there should be no sample selection bias.
Ellickson and Misra (2012) address a similar selection issue using post-choice outcome data. Although we lack post-
choice outcomes for non-fishing alternatives and cannot apply this method here, their approach is potentially applicable
to selection bias in multispecies fisheries.
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state variables to add flexibility. Ideally, we would include individual fixed effects, daily
fixed effects, and interactions with states. However, to preserve degrees of freedom and
rely on structural elements that can be used in a holdout sample, we interact individual
fixed effects from the production function with state variables and include the daily stock
shock as a regressor. Because individual and daily fixed effects cannot be known out-of-
sample, including them in the first-stage CCP prevents out-of-sample model validation
and thus limits the ability to conduct counterfactual policy experiments.
B. Second-Stage Estimation
As discussed above, this model is a finite horizon repeated game with an end period
denoted as T . Let uit(ait ,st ;θ) denote the expected choice specific utility without ξit . We
derive the recursive value function as
Vit(ait ,st ;θ) = uit(ait ,st ;θ)
+
T
∑
τ=t+1
λτ−t
∫ ∫
∑
a−iτ
uiτ(ϕ∗iτ(sτ,ξiτ),a−iτ,sτ,ξiτ;θ)∗σ−iτ(a−iτ|sτ)dF(ξiτ)dF(sτ|aτ−1,sτ−1)
(22)
For the continuation part, we use simulations to approximate the recursive forward inte-
gration. Based on the observations of state variables and actions for each vessel at time t,
we simulate the next period state variables according to the state transitions F(st+1|at ,st).
Then we draw ξi(t+1) for two potential actions from an i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value dis-
tribution. The decision rule, ϕ∗(st+1,ξi(t+1)), can subsequently be applied to determine
the action of each vessel. Given state variables and actions at t+1, state variables can be
simulated for t+2, and the procedure repeats until it reaches time T . The state variables
from time t+1 to T are simulated a sufficient number of times to obtain the continuation
part in Equation 22. The daily discount factor, λ, is set to 0.9998 in the estimation, which
is equivalent to an annual discount rate of 7.04 percent. Because we assume the one-
period utility function is additively separable for observable and unobservable variables
(Equation 12), the future component in Equation 22 is also separable in the observed
part and ξ. Equation 22 enables us to simulate different paths of the state dynamics and
evaluate the associated choice-specific value functions for different vessels at different
times. Since ξit is generated from a Type I Extreme Value distribution, the equilibrium
conditions imply that:
(23) σ(ai = 1|s) = exp(Vi(ai = 1,s;θ))1+ exp(Vi(ai = 1,s;θ))
The above equation is a standard logit model except for the value function. We use
the Pseudo-Likelihood Estimator (PML) to estimate θ (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002,
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2007)). The log-likelihood function is:
(24) L(θ) =
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
1
∑
k=0
ln(σ(ait = k|s))∗1(ait = k)
The entire model estimation is based on the assumption that fishermen’s observed ac-
tions constitute a Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Given equations 23 and 24, the estimator
for θ is.
(25) θ̂= argmax
θ∈Θ
L(θ)
The complete estimation procedure can be summarized in nine steps.
Step 1: Perform the first stage estimation, including exogenous state variable transi-
tions, the fishing production function, stock dynamics, and conditional choice probabili-
ties;
Step 2: Given state variables and actions at initial time t=1, draw new state variables
and ξi for each vessel i for the next period;
Step 3: Decide actions according to the decision rule estimated in the first step.
Step 4: Continue steps 2 and 3 for each day t = 2,3, ...T ;
Step 5: Repeat step 2 to 4 a sufficient number of times and compute the average;
Step 6: Repeat steps 2 through 5 resetting the initial time on each loop t = 2,3, ...T ;
Step 7: Do steps 2 through 6 for each year in the sample;
Step 8: Compute Equation 22;
Step 9: Estimate θ using Equation 25.
The simulation-based Conditional Choice Probability and Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
estimators save computational time. Because the period profit is a linear function of θ
which have not already been estimated in the first stage, we can separate these parameters
from the variables, and do not need to repeat step 2 to step 7 as many times as we iterate
over θ to compute Equation 22. In other words, when we maximize log-likelihood func-
tion (Equation 24) to estimate θ, we iterate over θ spaces to find the maximum without
re-simulating the model.
III. Empirical Setting and Data
The empirical application is the North Carolina shrimp fishery. The economic value
of the shrimp fishery has ranked first or second among all the fisheries in North Carolina
over the last 30 years. The annual average landings between 1962 and 2003 are 7,011,236
lbs and the landings and shrimp abundance vary largely from year to year due to variation
in environmental conditions (NCDENR-DMF 2006).
White shrimp (Penaeus setiferus), brown shrimp (Penaeus aztecus) and pink shrimp
(Penaeus duorarum) are the three major shrimp species harvested commercially in North
Carolina. They are landed predominantly from the Pamlico Sound, the Core Sound and
the Atlantic Ocean. The life histories of these three species are similar except that the
spawning times of the species vary.
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All three shrimp species have an annual life cycle that begins in the spring in deep
offshore areas. After a few weeks of development, the postlarvae migrate inshore to
estuarine nursery areas. These areas provide young shrimp with food and protection
from predation. As shrimp mature, they start to move from the shallow nursery areas into
deeper water. Adult shrimp continue to emigrate to offshore areas, leaving the estuary
and preparing to spawn. Most adults spawn a single time, and then complete an annual
life cycle. 17
There are two main regulations in North Carolina that affect commercial shrimp fishing
besides rules about net size and gear type. First, the shrimp season and fishing areas are
specified each month to prevent overfishing. 18 For the Albemarle-Pamlico Estuary,
where much of shrimp harvest occurs, the season usually closes in May and reopens in
early June each year. Second, in order to protect recreational boating and fishing, shrimp
trawling is banned in some of the inner estuaries on weekends (NCDENR-DMF 2006).
Three types of data are used in the analysis: harvest data, weather information, and
diesel prices. Harvest data is the primary dataset and is collected by the North Carolina
Division of Marine Fishery’s (DMF) trip ticket program (2000-2005). The trip ticket is
a required form on which dealers report commercial landings and other trip information.
It records vessel length, number of crew, gear type, trip starting and landing dates, price,
fishing location and quantity of each species landed for each trip. The dealers are re-
quired to submit the trip tickets to DMF every month. From 1978 to 1993, commercial
landings information were collected on a voluntary basis. Since 1994, the N.C. Gen-
eral Assembly has mandated trip-level reporting, which has produced one of the most
detailed state-level fisheries data collection programs in the United States.
In the trip ticket data, each vessel has a unique ID. The dataset contains over 2,000
unique IDs. However, not all the vessels are “active” ones. Shrimp may be caught as
bycatch, i.e. caught incidentally on fishing trips that predominantly target other species.
Or, shrimp can be caught by vessels that only go shrimping rarely. These vessels have
very few landings but would significantly increase the computational burden if included
in the model. Thus, we define an active vessel as one that has more than 100 records of
landing shrimp over six years. This restriction leaves 439 individual vessels that consti-
tute 85 percent of the total landings. Inactive vessels would likely have minor effects on
the parameter estimation of our model.
Restricting the harvest data to only active vessels still leaves more than 63,000 obser-
vations of shrimp landings from 2000-2005. Figure 1 shows the total daily harvest over
the 6 years and illustrates the annual seasonal pattern. Peak landing occur from July
through October, which account for 80.83 percent of the annual harvest. This harvest
distribution is consistent with a shrimp’s annual life cycle. Shrimp harvest also varies
substantially from year to year. Shrimp trawl dominates other gear types, accounting for
89.5 percent of total landings in sample.
[Figure 1 about here]
17Some shrimp can even survive as long as 18 months, but the annual life cycle is an accepted assumption in most
shrimp biological modeling.
18For the detailed proclamation, see http://www.ncfisheries.net/procs/index2k8.html
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Weather data, including wind speed and wave height, are compiled from the National
Data Buoy Center (National Data Buoy Center 1994-2005). 19 Since no buoy data di-
rectly represent the weather of the large Albemarle-Pamlico Estuary areas, we average
weather data over three stations: Station DSLN7, Station CLKN7 and Station 44014.
Vessels use #2 marine diesel, but a detailed time series of its regional price is not avail-
able. As a substitute, we use weekly retail diesel price obtained from the Energy In-
formation Administration (EIA) (U.S. Energy Information Administration 1994-2005).
20
By merging the landings data with weather and diesel price data, we construct a panel
that includes daily decisions and harvest of 439 vessels in the Albemarle-Pamlico Estu-
ary from 2000 to 2005, as well as vessel characteristics, daily weather, and weekly diesel
price. Table 1 provides summary statistics for selected variables. The table shows that
the total annual harvest varies over years, and daily catches have high volatility. Daily
catch variation reflects variation in the shrimp stock dynamics as well as heterogeneous
catching power and fishing skills of the different subsets of vessels participating on each
day. The shrimp price is a weighted average obtained by dividing total value by total
weight. Shrimp prices and diesel prices are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer
Price Index. The mean shrimp price shows that real prices trend downward over these
six years. Erosion of shrimp prices is generally attributed to increased competition from
imports, including farm-raised shrimp from Asia (Asche et al. 2012). The diesel price
also has a large variance, and not surprisingly, a clear increasing trend over 2000-2005.
Incorporating the diesel prices into the cost structure allows for the examination of the
effect of energy price changes on shrimp supplies. Note that we pool all years for esti-
mating dynamics of shrimp prices and diesel prices.
[Table 1 about here]
IV. Empirical results
A. State transitions
We first estimate the dynamics of the exogenous state variables. Before estimating time
series models, we use Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to see whether they are stationary
processes. The output indicates that the natural log of shrimp price, wind speed, and
wave height are stationary processes, and the natural log of diesel price is in need of
differencing in order to render it stationary.
We fit autoregressive (AR) models to shrimp price, wind speed, and wave height series.
The output is a vector AR(1) model. Wind speed and wave height may be highly cor-
related with each other, so we use a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) model to
recover their data generating processes simultaneously. The result shows that the model
correlation between logged wind speed and logged wave height is 0.58. For diesel price
dynamics, we use cubic b-splines (degree equal to 3) with 30 knots of Week because
19The data source: http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/maps/southeast hist.shtml.
20The data source: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet pri gnd a epd2d pte cpgal w.htm.
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diesel prices are collected on a weekly base. The b-spline allows for a flexible approxi-
mation for the diesel dynamics, which has a high adjusted R-square 0.98. Full results for
the exogenous state variables, including tests for stationarity and b-spline estimation, are
available in the Supplementary Material.
Parameter estimates of the production function and stock dynamics are presented in
Table 2. The OLS column reports the result from regressing logged harvest on logged
total vessel number (T vessel), season closure, and dummies for year, vessel, and polyno-
mials of ln(t). The columns labeled “IV” use “Weekend” as an instrument for total ves-
sel number. Table 2 also contains the fishing mortality coefficient, which is negative as
expected; more cumulative harvest reduces the stock relative to its deterministic within-
season baseline. We do not report the 439 vessel dummies due to space limitations. The
coefficient for total vessel number is positive and significant in OLS, but negative and
significant in the two-stage least square estimation. Thus using an instrument changes
the results. 21. According to the IV coefficient, one unit increase in vessel number will
decrease each vessel’s harvest in one day by 0.127 percent. This result reflects an instan-
taneous congestion externality. It is consistent with the tendency of shrimp trawling to
disperse aggregations of shrimp.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 also reports instrument validity tests for IV strength. The partial R2 and F tests
suggest that “Weekend” is a relevant instrument because it explains significant variation
in T vessel in an auxiliary regression. We also recover the parameters of the within-
season stock dynamics in the production function, shown in Table 2. Figure 2 illustrates
the deterministic stock index in year 2000. The bottom line depicts the stock index with
harvest, while the top line plots the stock index without harvest. The stock is consistent
with the harvest season. The IV regression error term is regressed on daily fixed effect
to obtain ζt . Furthermore, ζt is approximated by a Markov chain, which is shown in the
Supplementary Material.
[Figure 2 about here]
B. Policy function of fishing
We use a flexible logit model to estimate the first-stage conditional choice probabilities
(CCP) of the decision to fish. The results are presented in the Supplementary Material
due to space limit. The full model contains polynomials of shrimp price, deterministic
part of stock index, ζt , diesel price, weekend, wind speed, wave height, season clo-
sure, individual catchability qi, and interactions among different variables. This flexible
structure is intended to capture as much information as possible to mimic the initial con-
ditional choice probabilities.
21This sign reversal after instrumenting is consistent with findings in the recreational demand literature on congestion
(Timmins and Murdock 2007).
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C. Profit structure
Given the state transitions and CCP estimated above, we are able to simulate the state
variables and actions dynamically. After evaluating Equation 22, the pseudo maximum
likelihood estimator is applied to derive the structural parameters.
The final estimates of the profit function reported in Table 3 comport with basic in-
tuition. The third column shows the scale of different independent variables. If we
calculate the marginal effect of different variables on the profit based on these parame-
ters, we find that if harvest increases, both the total revenue and the cost increase. In fact,
the profit is a concave function of the harvest since the coefficient for harvest squared is
negative. Also, profit increases when the stock index increases. Higher Wind speed and
wave height induce higher costs, which are expected. Interactions between vessel length
and weather suggest that larger vessels have lower costs with high wind speed and wave
height, a reasonable finding because larger vessels face lower risks in bad weather. In
addition, the relationship between vessel length and cost is convex. Larger vessels face
higher marginal costs that increase in vessel size.
[Table 3 about here]
D. Model validation
One natural concern about multiple stage estimation is the model performance. The
second stage estimator depends on the accuracy of the first stage, i.e. CCP estimation.
One way to resolve this issue is to iterate multiple times using NPL proposed by Aguir-
regabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) 22. However, it is not computationally feasible to apply
NPL directly to our problem. Thus, it is important to check the performance of our
structural model.
To validate the model, we examine the explanatory power of the model predictions
for the actual observations. When we simulate the system, we can predict fishermen’s
fishing choices and use Equation 21 to predict harvest. Then we regress the actual obser-
vations on the predicted values of total harvest and fishing vessel number using both the
first-stage CCP estimator and the final structural estimator. Table 4 presents the results.
The first row shows the result of regressing the observed daily total vessel number on
the daily total vessel number predicted using the first-stage CCPs. Recall that in this
stage, the CCPs are estimated using a logit model with flexible polynomial functions and
interactions that do not lend themselves to a structural interpretation. The second row is
the regression result for total daily harvest using the same logic. Between 57 percent to
83 percent of the observed variation can be explained by the predicted data. The third
and fourth rows show R-squared from out-of-sample validation. Here, we estimate the
state transitions using six years of data (2000-2005), but estimate the policy function of
22In fact, we tried a Pseudo-NPL method. Using second-stage PML results, we calculate the probabilities for all
observed state variables. Then we regress the probability on a flexible function of state variables. Based on this function,
we can repeat the first-stage simulation based CCP estimation again, which starts the second round. PML is again applied
to obtain the new profit structure and then the new updated probability, and so on. Altogether we have done six iterations.
Supplementary Material Table 6 reports the profit structure for second to sixth iterations. The method is similar in spirit
to Sweeting (2013).
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fishing (CCP) based on five years of data (2000-2004), leaving year 2005 out. Then the
total daily harvest and daily vessel numbers are predicted for all years using the new
coefficients estimated from the partial data. We choose 2005 as our hold-out year be-
cause it is the most unusual year in our sample and thus likely to be the most difficult to
predict; the shapes of daily total effort and harvest in 2005 do not fit as well as those in
other years, but the R-squares are not very low. For other years, the prediction power is
similar.
[Table 4 about here]
The fifth and sixth rows of Table 4 present results for regressing the actual observations
on the predicted values using the full structural model with full data. R-squares show that
59 percent to 81 percent of the observed variation can be explained by the predicted data.
The explanatory power is preserved compared to the first-stage CCP. By construction,
the two-stage estimator imposes more structure and has fewer free parameters than the
first-stage CCP. Figure 3 visually illustrates the validation of the model for the fifth row
in the table.
[Figure 3 about here]
The final two rows of Table 4 present the results of using the two-stage structural model
on 2000-2004 data to predict 2000-2005. The first stage is the same model estimation
from row three and four, i.e. six years for state transitions estimation and five years for
CCP estimation. The second-stage estimation relies on five years data, leaving 2005 out.
Using the structural result, we then predict behavior in 2000-2005. Again, we see similar
explanatory power compared to that using all of data. Compared to the full sample, the
R-squared for 2005 actually improves slightly both for vessel number and harvest. Most
importantly, the structural model outperforms the first-stage CCP out of sample despite
CCP having much more flexibility to fit the data. This provides independent evidence
that the structural model is useful for policy analysis. In all, the profit structure revealed
in the two-stage estimator appears reasonable to implement the following counterfactual
experiments. In the same table, we also report the weighted mean absolute percentage
error (WMAPE) for different models. The WPAPE is defined as the absolute distance
between predicted and actual data relative to actual data, which are then weighted by
daily harvest. The result shows a similar pattern as the R-square.
V. Counterfactual experiments
With the profit structure of the North Carolina shrimp fishery recovered, we are able
to compute the potential efficiency gains from rationalization. In the following, we first
measure the economic gains if a daily vessel allocation policy is enforced to improve
efficiency. We then evaluate the existing season closure policy. Finally, we calculate the
efficiency change if there is no congestion effect.
A. Efficiency gains under daily vessel allocation policy
As individuals maximize their own profits taking other players’ actions as given, the
system achieves micro-level efficiency. By contrast, at the macro level the exploitation
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might not be efficient. Individuals pursuing their self interests will not lead to the social
optimum when there are externalities. The social planner should maximize the total
benefits to fishermen from the common-pool resource in terms of all individuals and all
periods. To this end, the planner ideally can enforce a daily vessel allocation policy, in
which the social planner decides which vessels are permitted to go fishing every day.
Consider the social planner’s problem:
(26) V = max
{It}Tt=1
E(
T
∑
t=1
λt−1Πt)
S.t.
Πt = ∑i Eξit ((αPricet ∗E(hit)−β∗S)∗1(ai = 1)+ξit)
Xt = X0G(t)e−φ∑
t
s=0 h(s)eζt
E(hit) = qi ∗ eWt ∗Xt
∗[1+ γ+ γ22 +(γ+ 3γ
2
2 )∑ j 6=iσ j(a j = 1|s)+ γ
2
2 ∑ j 6=k, j.k 6=iσ j(a j = 1|s)σ j(ak = 1|s)]
Let It define a 439 by 1 vector determining whether vessel i is allowed to going fishing
or not at time t. Iit is the ith element of It . If the ith element is equal to 1, it means that
vessel i is going fishing, while 0 means vessel i is not. The social planner seeks a path
of vectors of allocated vessels (It) to maximize the total profit for all vessels (Πt), given
that he knows the stock dynamics and the profit structure.
In order to maximize the total profits, the social planner need to dispatch the most
profitable vessels to fish every day. Since the profit structure (Table 3) has been revealed
for each individual vessel, we can rank the vessels by their daily profitability and then
choose the most profitable vessels to go fishing. Then we only need to find the daily
fishing vessel numbers ∑(It) for t = 1,2, ...365 for all six years in order to maximize the
total benefits.
In summary, the social planner can use the following backwards induction procedure
to find the optimal path for daily permitted vessel numbers.
Step 1: starting from the last day of the year T , for each discretized stock index,
compute the corresponding daily expected profits and sort them by their expected profits;
Step 2: based on the ordered profits, derive a mapping matrix between each discretized
stock size and the optimal number of permitted vessels ∑(It);
Step 3: on the penultimate day T −1, compute the expected profit for each discretized
value of the stock index. At this point, the profit is a summation of day T −1 and day T
expected profits. The day T profit can be read from the existing mapping matrix for time
T from step 2 given known stock dynamics.
Step 4: derive a mapping matrix between each discretized stock size and the optimal
number of permitted vessels for T −1 according to the comparison of the profits.
Step 5: repeat the procedure to derive the mapping matrices for all time periods.
With knowledge of the initial stock size (Table 2), the social planner can derive the
optimal path of permitted vessel numbers ∑(It)∗ using these mapping matrices. Here,
the precision of the stock discretization is set so that the fishermen’s actions can affect
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stock index. For example, the maximum stock for year 2005 is 50 and we divide it into
2000 uniform units. With such high precision, the computation time is long. In order to
substantially reduce the computational cost, we examine ∑(It) for every five vessels and
every twenty days over one year, i.e. the number is constrained as multiples of five and
the same for every twenty days.
Figure 4 depicts optimal vessel numbers vs. the predicted vessel numbers using the
method described above. The lines represent the optimal numbers of fishing vessels
less predicted ones, which are derived from the simulation of the structural model. Av-
eraging over thousands of stock paths, we obtain the predicted fishing vessel number.
Correspondingly, the horizontal lines are simply zeros for points of reference. For al-
most all years, we find that the optimal numbers of fishing vessels are lower than the
predicted ones in the early season. While in the season peak, the optimal numbers are
greater than the predicted ones except in 2005. The pattern is more pronounced when a
years stock size is larger. For 2005, since the stock is very low (in fact the lowest among
six years), the industry is better off decreasing the number of vessels fishing throughout
the year.
[Figure 4 about here]
We plot harvest and stock paths in Figure 5. The second and fourth column panels
depict the stock path. The bottom lines are stock dynamics net of predicted harvest
(harvest is based on actual behavior but excluding daily shocks to illustrate the seasonal
patterns), the lines in the middle are the stocks with optimal harvests, while the top lines
are the stocks without harvest. The stock grows larger in the optimal scenario compared
to the actual. The other panels show the pattern of optimal less predicted harvest. As
usual, the lines indicate the differences, and the horizontal lines are zeros for reference.
In the early seasons, the optimal harvest should be lower than the predicted harvest. In
the peak season, the harvest should be increased except 2005, since at this time, the stock
is high and the marginal fishing cost is lower. Again, 2005 is special in that the harvest
needs to be lowered to reduce fishing costs since the stock is the lowest.
[Figure 5 about here]
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the sources of efficiency loss in our common-pool resource
application. First, there are too many vessels fishing in the early seasons, an artifact of
strategic interactions that trigger the race to fish. During these periods, the stock is not
high and the productivity of fishing vessels is fairly low. Thus the fishing effort exerted
in these periods is excessive and should be reduced. Second, the excess fishing effort
in the early season causes lower stock in the peak season. This lower stock reduces
the harvest on the one hand, and increases the fishing cost on the other hand. Third,
the most profitable vessels are not necessarily the ones fishing. If we combine all the
sources of efficiency loss together, we find that 1.90 million dollars per year are lost due
to the inefficient exploitation scale and timing. This result and yearly efficiency losses
are reported in Table 5. The table also reports the efficiency loss is 20 percent of the
observed average annual revenue. We also estimate the status quo profit and find that
the efficiency gain is about 49 percent of the rent without deducting the capital costs. If
we included capital costs, this percentage would be substantially higher. Among the six
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years, 2002 has the highest efficiency loss in absolute value of $5.98 million dollars and
also has the highest percentage loss relative to the observed revenue.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 indicates that 2001, 2004 and 2005 have lower efficiency gains for absolute
values. This is not surprising in light of the confluence of multiple exogenous factors
eroding shrimp profitability in these years. From Table 1, we see that these years had
relatively lower real shrimp price and lower trip harvest. Moreover, from Table 2, these
years had much lower exogenous shrimp recruitment in the sample.
We also compute all the results for annual discount rates of 18 percent and 0 percent,
which are reported in the Supplemental Material. We find that the results are similar
in magnitude and very close in percentage terms because the discount rate assumptions
also change the baseline rents. The total efficiency gains are $1.76 million per year for
18 percent discount rate, and $2.01 million for 0 percent.
B. Program evaluation of the current season closure policy
Using our structural model, we can also evaluate the existing season closure policy in
North Carolina. It is important to recognize that the efficiency gains from a daily vessel
allocation policy described above would be additional. The season closure policy closes
some fishing areas from April to May, depending on the estimated abundance and growth
of shrimp. To find results, we simulate the dynamic game using the structural model and
setting the season closure coefficient to zero. Unlike the counterfactual experiments
above, here we have no social planner. We find that if the current season closure policy
is cancelled, the efficiency loss will be about $0.16 million per year. The related findings
are summarized in Table 5. We denote the efficiency gain due to the season closure policy
as E3. Among the six years, 2000 has the highest efficiency gain, which amounts to $0.55
million. However, we find these efficiency gains (E3) are relatively small as compared
to the efficiency gains from the vessel allocation policy (E1). On average, the current
season closure policy only produces efficiency gains of 2 percent of the observed revenue
OR. Another way to view this result is that the existing policy produces efficiency gains
relative to open access that are just a small fraction of that what our counterfactual daily
allocation policy would produce relative to the status quo.
The season closure policy could also be expanded. Only some fishing areas are closed,
and we observe substantial harvest during this closure period. To fully understand the
season closure policy, we can experiment with a strictly implemented policy that would
shut the fishery down entirely during the closure period. Again, we do not use a social
planner but assume no fishing during the closure period, simulate the resulting stock
dynamics, and evaluate the resulting behavior that comes out of the structural model.
The column denoted as E4 in Table 5 reports the results of this experiment. The effi-
ciency gains improve on the status quo but not by much. This result suggests that a more
stringent season closure policy for the North Carolina shrimp fishery could constitute
some small improvement on the existing second best policies. The current season clo-
sure policy already captures 75 percent of the efficiency loss if the policy would be fully
implemented. Whether a strict season closure policy would be more politically feasible
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than the much more valuable daily vessel allocation policy is an open question.
C. Congestion effects
The efficiency gains under both the daily vessel allocation policy and the season clo-
sure policy consist of the gains from reducing players’ strategic interactions and the im-
pacts of the stock externality. Congestion is another externality involved in the harvest.
In the process of estimating the stock index, we find a congestion effect in fishermen’s
harvest, indicated by the negative coefficient on T vessel in the IV regression (Table 2).
This effect is instantaneous in the production function. To measure the congestion effect
dynamically, we set the coefficient for T vessel to zero and re-simulate the system. Table
5 reports our finding of the gains of congestion effects. Counterintuitively, the conges-
tion effect leads to a net gain of $0.48 million per year, i.e., the congestion externality is
positive on average. The reason is that congestion itself has two effects on profits. First,
it reduces fishing revenues (and hence profits) instantaneously due to its negative sign.
Second, fishermen reduce their fishing effort in response to this negative congestion ef-
fect, which increases the stock size dynamically. The higher stock reduces fishing costs
and increases revenues later in the season. Thus, whether congestion is a net positive or
negative externality is empirically determined by these two opposing effects.
In contrast to other years, 2001 shows a net loss from congestion. Figure 4 offers pos-
sible explanations. In other years, excess fishing effort worsens as the fishery approaches
the peak (around day 200). In 2001, excess effort peaks much earlier, suggesting that
the required reduction near its peak season is more modest and the largest instantaneous
losses from congestion occur earlier in the season (and accordingly would be less dis-
counted). The amount of reduction required to achieve the optimum, the timing of reduc-
tion, and its duration all suggest that there is less to gain by mitigating the stock effect
in 2001 than in other years. The instantaneous losses from congestion thus outweigh
the long-run gains. Nevertheless, on average we find that, in the North Carolina shrimp
fishery, congestion has a positive effect on profits, which is about 5 percent of the mean
annual revenues.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of a shrimp fishery and
measure the costs of open access. The fishermen are modeled as playing a dynamic
game in which each fisherman’s action is influenced by other fishermen’s actions through
the stock externality. Because the shrimp fishery is an annual industry, we model the
dynamic programming problem with a finite horizon. The two-stage simulation-based
Conditional Choice Probability and pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) routines are em-
ployed to estimate the structural parameters. Our results have several important implica-
tions.
First and foremost, to promote the efficient use of the commons, policy instruments
need to address the strategic and dynamic interactions of individuals. Our results strongly
support the notion that the tragedy of the commons unfolds at the individual level and
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within each season. While this result alone may not be surprising in light of the volumi-
nous theoretical literature on the commons as well as theoretical predictions specific to
fisheries (Boyce 1992; Valcu and Weninger 2013), we are unaware of any previous em-
pirical study demonstrating that individual strategic and dynamic behavior is the mech-
anism that drives inefficient use of the commons. In fisheries, the catch phrase to de-
scribe this strategic dynamic interaction is the race to fish, and the conventional wisdom
amongst fisheries economists is that an individually transferable quota (ITQ) solves the
commons problem. Under an ITQ, vessels are allocated a tradable share of a biologically
sustainable cap each season, and the most efficient vessels fish by exploiting gains from
trade. However, if the timing of exploitation within a season is an important source of
inefficiency, it is unclear how an ITQ will solve the racing problem. Some fisheries un-
dergoing rationalization have spontaneously formed cooperatives, e.g. the Alaskan crab
fisheries. Whether it is possible for these cooperatives to dispatch effort as if they are
following our theoretical daily vessel allocation policy is a question for future research.
Anecdotally, it appears that there are de facto dispatchers in the recently rationalized
New England groundfish fisheries. Here, the fisheries have organized into cooperatives
called sectors in which a sector manager facilitates which vessels fish and which vessels
stay in port (Scheld, Anderson and Uchida 2012).
In contrast to ITQs, our daily vessel allocation policy steers individuals toward a more
efficient outcome on a finer time scale. As more fisheries around the world begin to ra-
tionalize, there will be many new empirical opportunities to analyze whether ITQs truly
undo the race to fish and to explore more spatially and temporally refined policy instru-
ments to address inefficiencies in common-pool resource use. The U.S. National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration recently released its catch shares policy (NOAA 2010)
promoting rights-based management of fisheries. The policy provides guidance to re-
gional fishery management councils on how to design rationalization programs. How-
ever, the policy does not mention the within-season timing of exploitation as a design
factor, and there are currently no ITQ fisheries that temporally delineate ITQs in this
way. Will fine-scale externalities fix themselves under an annual ITQ? Given our em-
pirical context, it is worth considering the experience of the Australian northern prawn
fishery, which has an annual effort ITQ. In support of the notion that fine-scale problems
fix themselves, 96 percent of right-holders have formed a corporation that makes daily
management decisions. But weighing against this notion, shutting down the fishery even
for short periods is still considered politically infeasible (Dichmont et al. 2010).
A related point is the efficiency gains from rationalizing North Carolina’s shrimp fish-
ery, though sizable, may actually be smaller than one would find in a typical fishery.
When rationalized by a daily allocation system, the total efficiency gain is around $1.90
million per year, which is 20 percent of the annual shrimp revenue in North Carolina.
However, shrimp are atypical compared to most major commercial fisheries in that there
is a weak stock-recruitment relationship; that is, what returns next season has little to
do with how much is left this season because shrimp are highly fecund and recruitment
depends largely on environmental conditions. This feature of shrimp biology obviates
the need for a cap on total allowable catch and is the basis for economists promoting
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limited entry to manage shrimp (Johnson and Libecap 1982). Most fisheries, in con-
trast, present the possibility of both recruitment overfishing (across seasons) and growth
overfishing (within season). Rationalizing a typical fishery may thus generate larger ef-
ficiency gains by imposing a cap on total harvest for the season and by controlling the
timing of exploitation within the season.
Less intuitively, we find that congestion on average has a net positive effect on resource
rents, suggesting a cautionary tale about static models of congestion. As expected, the
instantaneous effect is negative because congestion lowers productivity. This finding is
sensible in our case, as shrimp trawlers require a wide berth, there are many shallow
areas of the Abermarle-Pamlico estuarine system that limit the areas in which trawling
is possible, and trawling is known to disperse aggregations of shrimp. However, the
resulting lower productivity leads to an instantaneous reduction in fishing effort and thus
mitigates some of the dynamic stock externality in all but one year. This finding questions
studies in recreation demand in which negative congestion externalities are examined
statically and thus are assumed to be welfare reducing. A positive net effect may or
may not arise in other natural resource settings. It may be important to consider the
possibility that welfare losses attributed to congestion actually would produce welfare
gains dynamically if policy makers were unable to exclude resource users effectively.
Despite substantial gains from our daily allocation policy, solving the commons prob-
lem does not guarantee resource industry profitability. In 2005, the total rents with the
optimal policy are still lower than the total status quo rents in any other year in the sam-
ple. This weak performance is due to low shrimp prices, high fuel costs, and low shrimp
recruitment. These factors respectively reflect global seafood markets, global oil mar-
kets, and local environmental conditions, all of which are beyond the control of fishery
managers and individual fishermen. Ameliorating strategic interactions in the commons
does not address these challenges. Nevertheless, failure to solve commons problems
means that the industry is ill positioned to withstand a bad year in which multiple exoge-
nous shocks compound.
An interesting extension of this present study would be to include entry and exit as en-
dogenous decisions. Since in the present data, there is no information to identify whether
a vessel is a new investment or has exited the industry permanently, we assume there is
a fixed number of vessels every year. But if the investment or sale of the vessels is mod-
eled, we might be able to explain whether overcapitalization persists in the fishery. Since
the potential exitors have paid a high entry fixed cost and sunk cost, there exists “hystere-
sis” in exiting (Dixit 1989). In other words, the entry-exit problem is asymmetric: it is
easy to enter but harder to exit. With some extensions of the current work, it is possible
to test whether the asymmetric entry-exit problem causes overcapitalization.
Lastly, our application illustrates how new methodological developments in industrial
organization and microeconometrics may find fishery data sets useful. There are notable
complications relative to other applications in industrial organization, such as the impor-
tance of the fish stock, the inability to observe the stock directly, and the nonlinearity
of its growth. And one naturally wants to exercise caution in generalizing from a sin-
gle industry with some idiosyncratic features. Nevertheless, fisheries can be sources of
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high-quality data that document repeated choices of individual players over time. The
heterogeneity of global seafood production also means that the number of players in a
fishery can range widely from less than ten to more than 1,000. These extensions, along
with other interesting applications about the dynamics of the common-pool resource ex-
ploitation, are left for future research.
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FIGURE 1. TOTAL DAILY HARVEST (POUNDS)
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FIGURE 2. DETERMINISTIC PART OF THE DAILY STOCK INDEX OVER ONE YEAR
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FIGURE 3. COMPARISON OF PREDICTED FISHING VESSEL NUMBER AND OBSERVED FISHING VESSEL NUMBER
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FIGURE 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OPTIMAL FISHING VESSEL NUMBER AND PREDICTED FISHING VESSEL NUMBER
UNDER THE MPE
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FIGURE 5. DAILY PREDICTED HARVEST AND STOCK COMPARED TO DAILY OPTIMAL HARVEST AND STOCK
Note: For reference, the top stock line is the stock with no fishing and stock here refers
to the deterministic part of stock index.
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SELECTED STATE VARIABLES
Variable Statistics 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Annual harvest Sum 10334.9 5254.2 9969.0 6167.4 4880.8 2123.5
(thousand pounds)
Daily total Mean 28.3 14.4 27.3 16.9 13.4 5.8
harvest Std. Dev. 31.2 20.1 33.9 23.1 15.2 8.7
(thousand Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0
pounds) Maximum 163.0 87.0 175.2 99.0 71.1 36.3
Trip harvest Mean 313.6 199.9 272.4 251.1 220.5 207.0
(Pound) Std. Dev. 473.8 255.3 333.3 371.4 309.3 228.0
Minimum 0.3 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.2 0.5
Maximum 16326.1 7067.0 10012.6 10281.5 6941.2 4051.9
Fishing vesel Mean 71.5 63.0 88.2 61.7 52.9 25.2
number Std. Dev. 75.5 76.5 87.1 75.6 58.4 37.0
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 277 273 303 292 230 145
Shrimp price Mean 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8
($/pound) Std. Dev. 0.6 0.5 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.7
Minimum 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.7
Maximum 7.1 6.4 16.1 15.7 15.1 7.1
Diesel price Mean 150.3 135.8 126.1 144.0 164.0 212.9
(cents/gallon) Std. Dev. 9.8 10.4 8.4 10.3 18.9 27.3
Minimum 130.2 114.0 111.7 134.4 137.8 176.7
Maximum 166.7 154.2 143.6 170.9 200.7 282.6
Wind speed Mean 7.3 6.7 7.0 6.4 6.1 7.1
(100m/s) Std. Dev. 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9
Minimum 2.0 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.2
Maximum 17.0 14.5 14.2 19.3 14.9 21.6
Wave height Mean 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5
(m) Std. Dev. 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8
Minimum 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.5
Maximum 3.0 3.2 5.3 8.5 5.3 5.8
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TABLE 2—PRODUCTION REGRESSION
Panel A: Production Function*
OLS IV
Parameter Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Tvessel 0.00291 (0.000) -0.00127 ( 0.000)
Season closure(1 if open) 0.491 (0.015) 0.717 (0.018)
Wind Speed 0.0004 (0.002) -0.004 (0.002)
Wave Height 0.040 (0.007) 0.022 (0.007)
vessel dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Stock Dynamics**
year2000 0.375 ( 0.022) 0.577 (0.023)
year2001 -0.188 ( 0.015) 0.067 (0.018)
year2002 0.446 ( 0.021) 0.690 (0.023)
year2003 0.189 ( 0.016) 0.381 (0.017)
year2004 -0.044 ( 0.013) 0.080 (0.014)
year2005 – – – –
ln(t) 5.050 (0.271) 9.855 (0.323)
ln(t)2 -3.818 (0.152) -7.395 (0.205)
ln(t)3 0.906 (0.033) 1.797 (0.048)
ln(t)4 -0.066 (0.002) -0.137 (0.004)
Harvest accumulated -0.000000177 (0.000) -0.000000127 (0.000)
Observations 80,802 80,802
Panel C: Tests for instrument validity
Partial R2 F( 1, 80349) P-value
0.1752 17065.66 0.0000
*Note: The columns labeled with “IV” use “Weekend” as an instrument for Total vessel
number.
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TABLE 3—PROFIT STRUCTURE
Parameter Description Scale Coefficient (Standard Error)
revenue Shrimp price*Harvest 1000 dollars 1.43 (0.021)
wspd Wind speed 1 m/s -0.13 (0.003)
wvht Wave height 1 meter -0.29 (0.015)
diesel Diesel price 1 dollars -0.02 (0.000)
Weekend Saturday or Sunday 1 -0.84 (0.008)
stock stock size 1 stock index unit 0.06 (0.000)
len Vessel length 10 feet -0.31 (0.009)
len2 Vessel length squared 100 -0.04 (0.001)
len wspd Length*Wind speed 100 0.13 (0.006)
len wvht Length*Wave height 100 0.33 (0.029)
len diesel Length*diesel 100 0.02 (0.000)
har Harvest 1000 pounds -1.61 (0.109)
har len Harvest*length 10,000 0.67 (0.021)
har2 Harvest squared 1E+6 -5.16 (0.086)
Note: All harvest in this table is expected harvest.
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TABLE 4—MODEL VALIDATION
Panel A: R-square of regressing actual data on simulated data
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Model estimation using all data CCP only
Total vessel number 0.75 0.83 0.72 0.75 0.79 0.73
Total daily harvest 0.68 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.69 0.65
Model estimation using data 2000-2004 CCP only
Total vessel number 0.70 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.41
Total daily harvest 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.67 0.72 0.53
Model estimation using all data–structural model
Total vessel number 0.69 0.74 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.63
Total daily harvest 0.70 0.59 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.65
Model estimation using data 2000-2004–structural model
Total vessel number 0.69 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.66
Total daily harvest 0.70 0.60 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.66
Panel B: Weighted Mean Absolute Percentage Error
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Model estimation using all data CCP only
Total vessel number 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.42 0.31 0.36
Total daily harvest 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.56 0.45 0.57
Model estimation using data 2000-2004 CCP only
Total vessel number 0.46 0.29 0.28 0.47 0.38 2.35
Total daily harvest 0.50 0.53 0.47 0.50 0.38 1.37
Model estimation using all data–structural model
Total vessel number 0.35 0.43 0.26 0.36 0.39 0.45
Total daily harvest 0.49 0.59 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.67
Model estimation using data 2000-2004–structural model
Total vessel number 0.36 0.42 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.40
Total daily harvest 0.49 0.58 0.45 0.48 0.44 0.69
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